The Sino-Indian Border Talks, 1981-1989: A View from New Delhi by Ganguly, Sumit
 THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER TALKS,
 1981-1989
 A View from New Delhi
 Sumit Ganguly
 Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the People's Republic of China
 (PRC) in December 1988 was the first undertaken by an Indian prime
 minister since 1954. Though marked with considerable fanfare, including
 the inevitable trip to the Great Wall, the accomplishments of the visit were
 modest, primarily the creation of a Joint Working Group mandated to
 seek a solution to the long-standing border dispute. The two nations also
 agreed to broaden cultural, education, and scientific contacts. Finally, as
 stated in the ambiguous language of a diplomatic communique, New Delhi
 and Beijing agreed to maintain "peace and tranquility" along the border.
 From the Chinese standpoint, the most significant accomplishment was
 the explicit acknowledgment by Prime Minister Gandhi that Tibet is an
 internal affair of China. Chinese keenness to obtain this Indian endorse-
 ment was no doubt closely linked to the recent political stirrings in Tibet.
 To knowledgeable observers of Sino-Indian relations, the meagre out-
 comes of Gandhi's visit were not entirely unexpected. Though preceded
 by eight rounds of border talks at the bureaucratic level, which began in
 1981, a prime ministerial visit could not rapidly resolve an issue that con-
 tinues to provoke heated debate in India. To understand why the Sino-
 Indian border question has remained unresolved after nearly 30 years, it is
 necessary to examine not only what transpired in the talks but the larger
 political context in which they were held. The border dispute has a long
 and complex history.1 It led to a border war in October 1962 in which the
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 1. The only comprehensive study of the border conflict (although blatantly anti-Indian in
 tone) is by Neville Maxwell, India's China War (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972); a more
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 Indian side suffered a humiliating defeat. We will confine ourselves here to
 a discussion of efforts since the 1962 war to improve relations and resolve
 the conflict. According to the official Indian claim, the Chinese are occu-
 pying some 14,500 square miles of Indian territory. The Chinese, in turn,
 claim more than 30,000 additional square miles as their own.
 Evolution of the Talks
 While both China and India withdrew their ambassadors after the border
 war, diplomatic relations were never formally severed. But Indian humili-
 ation over the 1962 defeat, as well as Chinese support for the Naga and
 Mizo insurgencies in India's troubled northeast, inhibited any prospects
 for improved relations. Chinese involvement with the Naxalite Marxist
 guerrillas in West Bengal and their attempts to intimidate the Indian
 charge d'affaires in Peking during the Cultural Revolution also strained
 relations. The first possibility for ameliorating this tension-ridden situa-
 tion was raised by the Chinese in 1970 when Brajesh Mishra, the Indian
 charge d'affaires, was approached by Mao Zedong in a receiving line and
 warmly greeted. The episode came to be known as the "Mao smile." In
 the view of most analysts, this interest in cultivating India was closely re-
 lated to the border clashes on China's Siberian border and Chinese isola-
 tion in the world. Despite this overture, there was considerable hesitation
 in India on the question of normalizing relations. The memory of 1962
 and the continued hostile Chinese posture on the border made officials in
 the Ministry of External Affairs rather circumspect. Accordingly, the first
 demand India made was that the Chinese news agency, Xinhua, drop what
 Indians saw as a vicious propaganda campaign in order to create a better
 climate in which to deal with the border issue.
 Following the Indian national elections in March 1971, Zhou Enlai
 spoke once again to Brajesh Mishra, conveying congratulations to Indira
 Gandhi on her reelection. This goodwill, however, was to dissipate
 quickly in the forthcoming months. With the flight of some ten million
 refugees from East Pakistan into West Bengal, India was drawn into the
 Pakistan crisis. The Chinese, nominally the loyal ally of Pakistan, felt
 compelled to adopt a public posture inimical to India's position. Chinese
 intransigence toward India over the crisis increased with the signing of the
 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in August 1971.
 The treaty was signed owing to the common hostility of the two parties
 toward China and it also grew out of India's search for reassurance against
 possible Chinese aggression in the event of a war with Pakistan.
 balanced account will be found in Steven Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley:
 University of California Press, 1989).
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 It is not entirely clear what prompted Mrs. Gandhi to restore ambassa-
 dorial-level relations with the PRC in 1976. Two possible explanations
 appear plausible. The first might lie in her perception that the strategic
 environment in South Asia was taking an adverse turn for India, which
 had suffered a direct setback in Bangladesh with the overthrow of Sheikh
 Mujibur Rehman in August 1975. Not only had India helped Mujibur
 Rehman come to power, it subsequently had played an important role in
 keeping his political opponents at bay. His assassination by certain disaf-
 fected members of the Bangladeshi military was seen as a major setback
 for Indian foreign policy in the region. In a changing and possibly adverse
 subcontinental environment, Mrs. Gandhi might have deemed it prudent
 to improve relations with a long-standing regional adversary.
 A second and perhaps more compelling explanation can be found in
 Sikkim's change of status in 1974, becoming an "associate state" within
 the Indian union. In 1975 it was granted full statehood. The Chinese not
 only vigorously protested these actions but beefed up troops at strategic
 points along the northeastern border. One of the key positions included
 Longju-the site of the first Indian-Chinese armed clash in 1959. Noting
 the obvious Chinese displeasure with India's actions, Mrs. Gandhi decided
 it was important to initiate border talks, and to do this, Indian diplomats
 contend, it was necessary to upgrade the level of diplomatic representa-
 tion. Another development that could have encouraged restoration of re-
 lations was that by 1976 there had been a change in the Chinese
 leadership-both Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, the two principal protago-
 nists during the 1962 border conflict, had died-which probably eased the
 possibilities of holding discussions on the border question.
 Despite the exchange of ambassadors, little more was accomplished in
 the next two years as Mrs. Gandhi was voted out of power in 1977 owing
 to the harshness of the "state of emergency" she had declared and which
 had been in effect for 18 months. It was not until late 1979 that the Janata
 government sent Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpeyi to Beijing to dis-
 cuss the normalization of relations and the border question. This visit,
 however, was marked by striking Chinese insensitivity, as the Chinese at-
 tacked Vietnam during his visit and spoke of teaching Vietnam a lesson,
 just as they had taught India a "lesson" in 1962. It appears reasonable to
 infer that the Chinese felt that the Janata regime was a passing phase in
 Indian politics and they could well afford to treat its representatives cal-
 lously. The issue was to lie dormant until the second coming of Mrs. Gan-
 dhi in 1980. Chinese Premier Hua Guo Feng raised the issue with her at a
 meeting in Belgrade in May 1980, and the usual platitudes about the need
 for Sino-Indian friendship and the necessity for avoiding border clashes
 were stressed in the joint communique. Despite this seemingly routine ex-
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 pression of pious sentiments, the exchange did mean that both sides were
 interested in groping toward a solution.
 In June of the same year, Deng Xiaoping reiterated his interest in im-
 proving relations in two separate interviews with Indian journalists,
 Krishna Kumar and G. K. Reddy. External events, however, continued to
 impinge on any attempt to improve relations. Foreign Minister Huang
 Hua, who had been scheduled to visit India later in 1980, delayed his visit
 because of Indian recognition of the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin
 regime in Kampuchea. The Indian commitment to the diplomatic normal-
 ization process was apparent from Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao's
 carefully worded explanation of the delay. Refusing to take umbrage, he
 simply claimed that it was a routine postponement owing to prior commit-
 ments. He also reiterated India's desire to improve Sino-Indian relations.
 The Chinese overcame their pique and in June 1981 Huang Hua visited
 New Delhi. The very decision to hold talks entailed some concessions on
 both sides. After stating that the "border issue was central to the relations
 between the two nations," Huang Hua departed from the position that the
 issue be shelved if China's "package deal" was unacceptable. (The pack-
 age deal involved settling the dispute along the lines of actual control with
 minor adjustments in both the eastern and western sectors.) The Indian
 government in turn moved from its original position (as expressed in a
 1963 parliamentary resolution) that it would not hold substantive discus-
 sions with China until the Chinese vacated every inch of Indian territory.2
 Huang Hua, obviously with an eye toward influencing Indian public opin-
 ion, also announced that the Chinese would open two ancient Hindu pil-
 grimage sites in Tibet-Mansarovar and Kailash.
 The Eight Rounds
 Most of the Indian officials who were closely connected with the process of
 border talks between 1981 and 1988 cluster the eight rounds into two
 groups. Though the specific division varies, they all agree that the first
 four dealt with "basic principles" and the last four with "the situation on
 the ground."3
 The first round. The first round of talks began in December 1981 with
 the Chinese offering the so-called package proposal, a suggestion Deng
 Xiaoping had put forth via the two visiting Indian journalists. Pared to
 the bone, this proposal entailed freezing the status quo on the ground, with
 minor concessions by both sides. Its seriousness can be questioned be-
 2. Asian Recorder, August 6-12, 1981, pp. 161-62.
 3. Interview with a senior Indian foreign service officer (hereafter FSO), June 1988, New
 York City.
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 cause, when pressed by the Indian side, the Chinese refused any carto-
 graphic examination. In fact, according to a senior Indian official closely
 connected with this round, the Chinese did not appear interested in turn-
 ing it into anything more than a propaganda exercise. When the Indian
 side appeared less-than-enthusiastic about the package proposal, the Chi-
 nese suggested that the border issue be frozen and progress be made on
 other matters such as scientific and cultural exchanges.
 Foreign Minister Rao rejected the Deng package proposal, contending
 that it equated the aggressor with the victim, denied the legality of the
 MacMahon Line, and in no way assuaged India's 1962 humiliation. Fur-
 thermore, it was felt that the package would legitimize Chinese gains made
 through the use of force. Additionally, there was a historical problem as-
 sociated with this proposal as, in many ways, it was a reprise of the one
 made by Zhou Enlai in 1960. It had been rejected then because of Chinese
 claims to significant portions of land claimed by India. To accept the pro-
 posal in 1978 would have meant further territorial concessions.5 India's
 minimal expectation was that the Chinese would concede that they were
 occupying a modicum of Indian, or at least disputed territory. From a
 negotiating standpoint, this position could hardly be deemed particularly
 helpful, but it needs to be borne in mind that many in the Ministry of
 External Affairs had strong memories of the humiliating defeat inflicted on
 India by China in 1962 and this had strongly colored their perceptions. In
 fact, in the words of an Indian diplomat who has been associated with the
 border talks, there are the so-called "settlers" (of the dispute) and "non-
 settlers" in the Ministry of External Affairs.
 The second and third rounds. The first round ended without accomplish-
 ing much beyond agreeing to meet again. By the second round, which was
 held in New Delhi, Chinese ardor had cooled considerably and little tran-
 spired then or in the third round. India's position was that it would not
 discuss the legality of the case as the legal positions of the two sides had
 been fairly well documented in the Officials' Report of 1960.6 The one
 tangible concession that the Indian side was willing to make was that it
 would seek some common ground without abandoning its legal position.
 The fourth round. In this round of talks the Indian side agreed to the
 Chinese suggestion that normalization should proceed in other spheres
 without necessarily linking them to the border talks. The round led to a
 4. Interview with a senior (retired) FSO, July 1988, New Delhi.
 5. Interview with an Indian FSO, March 1988, Washington, D.C.
 6. Ministry of External Affairs, Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the
 People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question (New Delhi: Government of India,
 February 1961).
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 substantial expansion of exchanges in a range of areas including science,
 culture, and trade. A major agreement was also reached on how the talks
 would be conducted, namely, that they would proceed on a sector by sec-
 tor basis. The success of this round may have had something to do with
 the gradual improvement in bilateral Sino-Soviet relations. Shortly before
 this round of talks in 1982, Brezhnev had made overtures to Beijing and in
 October 1983 the Chinese held their third round of negotiations with the
 Soviets. Though this argument rests entirely on a process of inference and
 attribution, it does appear reasonable to suggest that the Indians may have
 perceived a greater need to move on the border question in the light of
 improved Sino-Soviet relations.
 The fifth round. It now appeared thati there was a real likelihood of a
 breakthrough. The Chinese position had softened somewhat and accord-
 ing to an Indian official closely connected with the talks, the Chinese ap-
 peared amenable to settling the dispute along the MacMahon Line in the
 eastern sector with minor Indian concessions. They also wanted certain
 pieces of Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area. This proposal was dis-
 cussed at some length, but in the end Indian domestic politics led to an
 abandonment of the proposal. Mrs. Gandhi was concerned about the
 forthcoming election in 1985 and did not wish to convey the appearance of
 Indian weakness. Subsequently, following her assassination in October
 1984, the government appeared unwilling to take a bold initiative to try to
 resolve this contentious issue.7
 Between the fifth and sixth rounds, considerable contact took place be-
 tween the two sides but little was accomplished when the actual talks got
 underway. Just prior to the sixth round, Foreign Minister Bali Ram Bha-
 gat met with his counterpart, Wu Xueqluin, in New York and both sides
 expressed considerable optimism about the forthcoming round of talks.
 Wu, in fact, stated that the border question was the "only outstanding
 problem" and that the dispute could be settled with a spirit of "mutual
 accommodation and mutual understanding." This seemingly innocuous
 language is fraught with meaning, suggesting that both sides were equally
 at fault in the 1962 war. Wu also conveyed Chinese Prime Minister Zhao
 Ziyang's desire to hold talks with Rajiv Gandhi, and in due course these
 talks were held (October 1985) in New York. Zhao renewed the invitation
 to Rajiv Gandhi to visit China, but Gandhi stated that little would be
 7. Interview with a senior (retired) Indian FSO, August 1988, New Delhi.
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 achieved by such a trip unless the proper preparatory work had been
 done.8
 The sixth round. The Chinese returned to the package proposal in the
 sixth round. They also put forward their long-standing claim that the
 traditional boundary line to the east ran well south of the MacMahon
 Line, that is, the Himalayan crest. Thus, far from the expected break-
 through, the Indians perceived that the Chinese had simply toughened
 their position. In December 1985 the external affairs minister stated in the
 Rajya Sabha that the resolution of the border problem was a prerequisite
 for a complete normalization of relations.
 In 1986 relations with China deteriorated. There were allegations of
 Chinese involvement in Pakistan's nuclear program, and the Annual Re-
 port of the Indian Defense Ministry, which had a new section on national
 security, included a discussion of the security threat from the PRC. But
 hopes for an improvement in relations were once again raised in May when
 Xinhua carried an article that suggested a softening of the Chinese position
 on the MacMahon Line. Essentially, the Chinese suggested that as a con-
 sequence of British and Indian forward policies "an actual line of control
 between the two sides has taken place on the Chinese side of the bound-
 ary." There was a prompt Indian response to this perceived Chinese soft-
 ening, including statements to the effect that grounds had finally been
 found for an acceptable settlement and that the foreign minister might visit
 Beijing at the end of the year, although it should be noted that this belief in
 a Chinese "softening" was not universally shared in the Indian Ministry of
 External Affairs.9
 If indeed the portents had seemed propitious for movement toward a
 border settlement, they were quickly rendered meaningless. In an inter-
 view with visiting Indian journalists in mid-June 1986, the Chinese vice-
 foreign minister and leader of the delegation to the border talks stated that
 no settlement could be reached unless India made concessions in the east.
 He added that the eastern sector was the biggest dispute of all and said
 that, in his view, India was in occupation of as much as 90,000 square
 miles of Chinese territory. This new stand marked a critical departure
 from a previously held position, which had sought to press Chinese claims
 in the Aksai Chin region in the west. In effect, the Chinese appeared to
 8. Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, "India-China: The Year of Two Possibilities," in Yearbook
 on India's Foreign Policy, 1985-1986, Satish Kumar, ed. (New Delhi: Sage Publications,
 1987), p. 153.
 9. Interview with an Indian FSO, March 1989, Washington, D.C.
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 convey the message that they would raise the costs of negotiation if the
 Indians adopted what was perceived as an uncompromising attitude.10
 To complicate an already muddled picture, the Chinese, shortly before
 the start of the seventh round of border talks, made incursions in an area
 known as Sumdurong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh, an area of east-west
 mountain ranges that forms the trijunction of India, Bhutan, and China.
 This incursion reportedly was a response to an Indian probe in the area the
 previous year. The Indian army had sent a small patrol into the region to
 test both Chinese preparedness and the response of the Soviet Union. In-
 dia was particularly interested in the Soviet response because of recent So-
 viet overtures toward China. It is not entirely clear how the Soviets
 reacted but the Chinese reaction demonstrated the dangers of possible es-
 calation from these probes and counterprobes. It is interesting to note that
 there had been a degree of institutional learning as a consequence of the
 1962 disaster. Unlike in the late 1950s when Prime Minister Nehru had
 kept Parliament largely uninformed about Chinese road-building activities
 in Aksai Chin, Minister of State for External Affairs K. R. Narayanan
 promptly announced to Parliament the difficulties with the Chinese at
 Sumdurong Chu.
 The seventh round. Despite this episode, the seventh round of border
 talks were held as planned in July 1986. The Sumdurong Chu incident,
 which had made the Indian side quite circumspect and the Chinese side
 intransigent, was actively discussed in this round. The package proposal
 was simply not mentioned and little substantive agreement was reached.11
 The only positive development was removal of a minor irritant-a settle-
 ment over the acquisition of some property for the Indian embassy in Bei-
 jing as compensation for some land seized by the Chinese during the
 Cultural Revolution.12 Following the round, the new Indian foreign min-
 ister, Shiv Shankar, met with Wu Xueqian in New York where both
 agreed on the need to prevent incidents of the kind that had just occurred.
 It is believed that Shiv Shankar proposed that one way of defusing tension
 in the area might be for the Chinese to withdraw from Wangdong in the
 Sumdurong Chu valley in winter and, by the same token, it was agreed
 that the Indian patrols would not return to the area until the snows
 melted.
 Between the seventh and the eighth and final round of talks, an impor-
 tant episode punctuated relations between the two nations. On December
 10. Ibid.
 11. Interview with a senior (retired) Indian FSO, January 1989, New Delhi.
 12. Ibid; also Nancy Jetly, "Sino-Indian Relations: A Quest for Normalization," India
 Quarterly 47:1 (January-March 1986), p. 56.
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 8-9, 1986, the Indian Parliament conferred full statehood on Arunachal
 Pradesh, the disputed area in the eastern sector. From the Indian stand-
 point, this was simply a logical evolution of the administrative process.
 The Chinese, however, saw it as a possible legal erosion of their claim in
 the eastern sector. (In 1982 they had protested vigorously after Arunachal
 Pradesh sent a company of dancers to perform at the New Delhi ASIAD.)
 Despite the statehood and the demonstration of Indian military capacity
 by General Sundarji's Operation Checkerboard, the eighth round of talks
 were held as planned.13 Though precise: details about Operation Checker-
 board remain unavailable, some observers contend that its significance lay
 well beyond an attempt to test India's defense preparedness along the Sino-
 Indian front. Like its predecessor, Operation Brasstacks, Checkerboard
 may have been an attempt to test the responses of both superpowers in the
 event of a Sino-Indian border conflict. It may also have been an attempt to
 test the continuing vitality of the Indo-Soviet relationship in the wake of
 Mikhail Gorbachev's July 1986 Vladivostok speech in which he had at-
 tached greater significance to Soviet relations with China and Japan than
 with India.14 On a more positive note, India carefully (some argued too
 carefully) continued to avoid giving China any grief on the Tibetan upris-
 ing by defining it as an internal affair of the PRC.
 The eighth round. The need to avoid military confrontation was appar-
 ently stressed on both sides in this round of talks, and greater interest in
 economic cooperation and trade was expressed. Clearly, the upshot of the
 talks seemed to be that the border issue could not be settled at the bureau-
 cratic level and that a political initiative was necessary. In the words of a
 prominent Indian political commentator, writing shortly after the comple-
 tion of the round:
 What seems to have been achieved is the awareness of the need for a political
 initiative. At the same time, there has come about an understanding on the
 steps to de-escalate armed confrontation on the ground, a move which will be
 facilitated in this season of heavy snows in the concerned area. It is also agreed
 on both sides that conscious efforts need to be made for stepping up trade and
 economic cooperation, while more activity in the field of cultural cooperation
 will certainly help better understanding at the popular mass level. Exchange of
 ministerial-level visits seems to be on the agenda.15
 13. Very little exists in the public domain about Operation Checkerboard. The only book
 on the subject is Ravi Rikhye's polemical and disjointed account, The War that Never Was
 (New Delhi: Prism India paperbacks, 1989).
 14. Nayan Chanda, "Heading for a Conflict," Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter
 FEER), June 4, 1987, p. 42.
 15. Nikhil Chakravarty, "There Is a Distinct Thaw in the Chinese Mood," The Telegraph,
 November 22, 1987.
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 To that end, after much deliberation, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi de-
 cided to visit Beijing in December 1988.
 Rajiv Gandhi's Visit and Its Aftermath
 Rajiv Gandhi's decision to visit China stemmed from a variety of con-
 cerns. First, the talks, in the words of a prominent Indian diplomat, "had
 reached a diplomatic cul-de-sac." Without political intervention little
 more could be accomplished. Second, the specific timing of the visit was
 influenced by considerations of domestic politics. The prime minister had
 lost a great deal of popularity due to two persisting domestic issues-fail-
 ure to quell the rising tide of violence in the Punjab despite considerable
 expansion of the coercive machinery of the state, and the barrage of accu-
 sations from the opposition charging his government with receiving large
 kickbacks on defense contracts, especially the purchase of Swedish Bofors
 guns. The second issue had acquired greater salience after the resignation
 of Gandhi's defense minister, V. P. Singh, who had called for a thorough
 investigation of the Bofors deal. In this weakened domestic context, the
 prime minister needed a major foreign policy success to boost his sagging
 political fortunes. The time was ripe to use the Sino-Indian border issue
 both to seek such success and to strengthen Gandhi's political position.
 Admittedly, this strategy was not without risk. If the prime minister re-
 turned empty-handed from China, the political costs would not be small.
 Yet, the costs of inaction were no doubt deemed to be worse. Gandhi's
 decision to move ahead on the Sino-Indian border question was probably
 also reinforced by the shifting character of Sino-Soviet relations. The
 long-standing hostility that had worked to the benefit of India in the past
 showed small but significant signs of change. With the Deng-Gorbachev
 summit looming in the not-so-distant future, it behooved India to take
 steps to improve relations with the Chinese. In the context of a Sino-
 Soviet rapprochement, however gradual or partial, India could no longer
 count on unstinted Soviet support on Sino-Indian differences.
 The China trip appears to have achieved three specific objectives. First,
 it addressed a long-standing Chinese complaint that an Indian prime min-
 ister had not reciprocated Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's 1960 visit. Though
 merely a matter of protocol, Indian diplomats claim this was an important
 matter to the Chinese. Second, the visit led to the creation of a Joint
 Working Group to deal exclusively with the border question. Third, it has
 contributed to a more relaxed climate in Sino-Indian relations, and while
 this may not seem like a substantive accomplishment, there may be signifi-
 cance to it. Though Indian diplomats were reluctant to divulge any details
 during the course of numerous interviews conducted in New Delhi in Jan-
 uary 1989, they hinted that measures to maintain "peace and tranquility
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 on the border" might include prior notification of military exercises and
 other confidence-building measures. This is not a minor accomplishment
 given the rapid escalation of military forces on both sides during the
 Sumdurong Chu incident of 1987.
 Despite these accomplishments, Rajiv Gandhi's trip was criticized by
 both newspaper columnists and members of the opposition. They zeroed
 in on his statement that "Tibet is an internal affair of China."16 In the
 view of his critics, this amounted not only to a betrayal of the Tibetan
 cause, but also a failure to extract similar concessions from the Chinese
 on India's disputed territories. They have argued that Gandhi should
 have sought a similar statement from China on Kashmir, Sikkim, and
 Arunachal Pradesh. Indian officials closely associated with the visit take a
 markedly different view, contending that the prime minister's statement
 was the mere reiteration of a long-standing Indian position that dates back
 to 1954 when India formally acknowledged Chinese sovereignty in Tibet.
 Furthermore, they argue it would have been foolish to seek a similar en-
 dorsement on disputed Indian territories17 because a sovereign state does
 not need outside parties to affirm its national boundaries; that the Chinese
 needed to obtain Indian reiteration of the legal position of Tibet was an
 indication of Chinese weakness, not strength. But unless the government
 can forcefully articulate this argument, which has both intuitive and logi-
 cal appeal, Indian elite opinion is likely to be swayed by the critical
 charges leveled by the journalistic community.
 The critics have also focused on the Joint Working Group. They point
 out that a similar organization was created in 1960 after Zhou Enlai's ill-
 fated visit that year. It produced a document known as the Officials' Re-
 port, which adduced all the legal, historical, and customary evidence that
 the two sides could muster on their respective claims to the disputed bor-
 der. As the political deadlock persisted, the Officials' Report amounted to
 little more than an academic exercise. The present misgiving is that the
 Joint Working Group's efforts will meet a similar fate. But diplomats
 closely associated with this process are eager to stress the differences be-
 tween the two groups. First, they contend that, unlike in 1960, the neces-
 sary political will exists on both sides to reach a settlement, and second,
 they claim that the Joint Working Group will not only present the avail-
 able evidence but actively seek a political settlement.18
 Government officials have successfully addressed most of the criticisms.
 The one they cannot entirely answer deals with the prime minister's public
 16. For example, Megnad Sen, "Deuce, Advantage China," Indian Express, January 26,
 1989, and Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, "The New Diplomacy," The Statesman, January 8, 1989.
 17. Interview with an Indian FSO, January 1989, New Delhi.
 18. Ibid.
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 statement on the status of Tibet. Many have stated that the same effect
 could have been achieved in private without referring to the 1954 Sino-
 Indian agreement. Unfortunately, this explicit Indian endorsement of the
 Chinese position on Tibet undermines the scope of politico-diplomatic ma-
 neuver for the Tibetans. Having granted asylum to the Dalai Lama in
 1959 and having provided sanctuary to over 100,000 Tibetans since then,
 the prime minister's public avowal of the Chinese position undermines the
 Tibetan cause.
 Conclusion
 What general conclusions can be drawn from these protracted negotia-
 tions? Three quickly come to mind. First, if one looks closely at the bor-
 der talks, it becomes apparent that the Chinese have taken the vast
 majority of the initiatives, ranging from the package proposal to the open-
 ing of Mansarovar and Kailash. These initiatives have had little substance,
 but they have created the impression that the Chinese are far more flexible
 and willing to settle the border dispute. In contrast, the substantive ges-
 tures on the Indian side, such as the restoration of ambassadorial-level
 relations, have not received adequate attention. India, determinedly focus-
 ing on the legal/moral merits of its case, has not been nearly as deft in
 engaging in public posturing. For the most part, it has both given the
 appearance of being reactive and has, in fact, been so, largely responding
 to Chinese initiatives. From Deng's package proposal to Rajiv Gandhi's
 most recent visit to China, the suggestions have come from the Chinese
 side. Even small, arcane gestures on the Chinese side have prompted
 much activity in New Delhi. In this regard one can recall how reports in
 the Chinese press shortly before the seventh round sent Indian officials
 scurrying about, attempting to fathom what the Chinese meant with the
 changed language.
 Second, it is apparent that there are divisions within the Indian External
 Affairs Ministry about how best to settle the border dispute. As alluded to
 earlier, there are "settlers" and "non-settlers" in the ministry. Both pri-
 vately and publicly, former Foreign Secretary A. P. Venkateshwaran has
 spoken of "lost opportunities" for settling the dispute.19 Yet others in the
 ministry contend that no such opportunities have ever materialized. Fi-
 nally, the dispute has persisted this long largely because neither side has a
 compelling need to settle it. Even if the dispute is resolved, India and the
 PRC will retain a competitive relationship in Asia. Both have self-images
 as great powers in Asia and have markedly different political systems, driv-
 19. A. P. Venkateshwaran, "Just Neighbours, or Friends?" Indian Express Magazine, July
 5, 1987.
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 ing them to support different nations and causes. The Chinese will con-
 tinue to support Pakistan at varying levels and India will continue its pro-
 Vietnamese policy. Resolution of these disputes may lead to improved bi-
 lateral relations, perhaps even a reduction in levels of defense expenditures,
 but the competitive character of the relationship will remain.20
 Despite the structural limits to improvement of the relationship, it is
 apparent that India is determined to move toward resolution of the border
 dispute. In early June 1989, Chinese troops ruthlessly suppressed the stu-
 dent-led prodemocracy movement in Beijing. While most of the world re-
 acted quite sharply to the massacre, the Indian Ministry of External
 Affairs issued a carefully worded statement that avoided direct criticism of
 the Chinese leadership. Furthermore, India did not postpone the first
 meeting of the Joint Working Group.21 Both of these gestures clearly con-
 veyed a message to Beijing that the Indian leadership was prepared to con-
 tinue doing business with the Chinese despite their diplomatic isolation
 after the events in Tiananmen Square.
 As to what lies in store for the future of the Sino-Indian border question,
 much depends on the domestic political leadership in both countries. The
 defeat of the Rajiv Gandhi government in the November 1989 parliamen-
 tary elections in India and the uncertainty concerning the continued domi-
 nance of Deng Xiaoping and his group in the PRC raise some problems for
 the Joint Working Group. But there is certainly no basis as yet in assum-
 ing that the new government in India and the emerging collective leader-
 ship in the PRC will be any less interested in resolving the boundary
 question. Thus, the Joint Working Group may continue to slowly inch its
 way toward a political settlement.
 20. John W. Garver, "Chinese-Indian Rivalry in Indochina," Asian Survey 27:11 (Novem-
 ber 1987), pp. 1205-18.
 21. Robert Delfs, "Tiananmen Massacre," FEER, June 15, 1989, pp. 10-11.
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